User:Сергей Олегович/sandbox

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Russian view on cause of Syrian Civil War[edit]

Statement of Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the United Nations General Assembly, 28 September 2015. Excerpts on the situation in Syria:

“(…) We all know that after the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world. And those who found themselves at the top of that pyramid were tempted to think that if we are so strong and exceptional then we know better than anyone what to do and why at all should we reckon with the UN, which instead of automatically authorizing and legitimizing necessary decisions often creates obstacles or, in other words, “stands in the way”. (…) Russia is ready to work together with all partners on the basis of broad consensus, but we consider the attempts to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely dangerous. They can lead to a collapse of the entire architecture of international relations. Then, indeed, we would be left with no other rules than the rule of force.
(…) We are all different. And we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the only right one.
(…) Attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems however, that far from learning from others’ mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them. And so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called “democratic” ones, continues. Suffice it to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. (…) Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster. (…) It is now obvious that the power vacuum created in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa led to emergence of anarchy areas. Those immediately started to be filled with extremists and terrorists. Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called “Islamic State”. (…) And now the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called “moderate” Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the Islamic State.
(…) Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its Armed Forces (…) We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad’s Armed Forces and Kurd militia are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria. (…)”[1]

Russia called for cooperation with the Syrian government as "no-one except for Assad and his militia is truly fighting Isis in Syria."[2]

Russian peace initiatives[edit]

Main article: Syrian Civil War peace process

On 30 January 2012, the Russian foreign ministry suggested “informal” talks in Moscow between the Syrian regime and opposition, and said the Syrian authorities had already agreed to the Russian offer. Abdel Baset Seda, a member of the Syrian National Council’s executive committee, told Reuters that the SNC had not received any formal invitation for such talks, but would decline if one arrived: “Our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad)”.[3]

According to Martti Ahtisaari who held discussions about Syria with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in February 2012, a Russian three-point plan, put forth by its ambassador, Vitaly Churkin included a proposal for Assad to cede power. The plan also required the Syrian government and the opposition to come to the negotiating table. It was ignored by the US, Britain and France, because at the time they thought that Assad's regime was about to fall.[4]

7 November 2013, Russia again announced it was trying to broker talks in Moscow between the Syrian government and opposition, seeing that the U.S. and Russian negotiators failed to agree on whether or not Assad should be forced out of office.[5] Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov said the Moscow talks could focus on humanitarian problems as well on some political issues.[5]

Motivations[edit]

Economic importance and history of arms sales[edit]

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad

Arms sales from the Soviet Union and Russia to Syria are well-documented. Reports released by the United States Congressional Research Service in 2008 note that Syria purchased several billions of dollars' worth of military equipment from the former Soviet Union, including SS-21 "Scarab" short-range missiles (range 70 km).[6] According to the report, Soviet military sales to Syria in the 1970s and 80's were so extensive, they accounted for 90% of all military arms exports from the Soviet Union, making the Soviet Union a main supplier of arms for Syria.[6] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Syria found itself deprived of arms imports, but continued to seek them through Soviet satellite states.[6] The establishment of Russian Federation in 1992 saw the re-introduction of the patron-vendor relationship and the cancellation of almost 73% of Syria's debt.[6]

Russia has shipped arms during the uprising to Assad's government allegedly for use against rebels.[7]

As of 2015, Russia is the world's second largest arms exporter (behind the United States) and lost $4 billion in Libyan contracts due to a United Nations arms embargo in 2011.[8] According to reports, 2.4% of Russia's exports comes from defense-related sales, so the recent Arab Spring conflicts saw an uptick in sales to countries like Syria.[9] Russia's backing of the Assad government has been seen as preventing the loss of a Russian ally that will purchase Russian weapons as happened in Libya.[citation needed].[10]

Military facilities[edit]

Main articles: Russian naval facility in Tartus and Center C

Much attention has also been pointed at Tartus, Syria, which is home to Russia's only naval facility in the Mediterranean region.

In the opinion of some commentators one of Russia's major interests is access to the port of Tartus, home to its only remaining military facility outside the former USSR and a key source of its influence in the eastern Mediterranean.[11]

Critics say the position of the naval facility serves as a chief motivating factor for speaking out in favor of the Assad government to maintain stability in the region.[clarification needed][12][13]

The Deputy Russian Foreign Minister stated in June 2013 that the Russian naval base at Tartus had been evacuated. Mikhail Bogdanov stated that: "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".[14][15] However, on 1 October 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry said that it had deployed over 50 planes and helicopters to Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. It was possible because we had most of the materiel and ammunition ready at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some extra equipment."[16]

Russia also maintains an OSNAZ GRU electronic surveillance facilities in Latakia[17] and Al-Harra[18] (captured by the rebels in October 2014) and airbase facilities at Tadmur (Palmyra).[19]

The Syrian government hosted the Russian GRU Center C listening station near the Syrian-Israeli border at Tel Al-Hara for an unknown number of years. The station was abandoned in late 2014 before it could be overrun by American-backed rebels. Syria is believed to host at least two other Russian intelligence bases.[20]

Chechen and Caucasus jihadists in Syria[edit]

See also: Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War

A number of Chechen and other North Caucasus volunteers travelled to fight in the Syrian Civil War against the government of Bashar al-Assad.[21] The Washington Post reported that "Many may hope to pick up contacts for an eventual return to fighting in Russia, a possibility that clearly concerns Moscow."[22] In December 2013, the Chechen-led Syrian jihadist group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA) split away from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),[23] emphasising that they wished to continue respecting the Oath of Allegiance they had made to the Caucasus Emirate's Dokka Umarov.[24] In September 2015, JMA pledged allegiance to the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front.[25]

Approximately 2,500 Russian nationals and 7,000 citizens of other post-Soviet republics are fighting alongside the Islamic State.[26] A veteran of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and a former sergeant in the Georgian Army, Abu Omar al-Shishani, currently serves as a commander for the Islamic State in Syria.[27]

Circassian diaspora[edit]

See also: Circassians in Syria § Post-independence

There is a small Circassian diaspora in Syria consisting of the descendants of the muhajirs who emigrated or were expelled from the Caucasus in the aftermath of the Caucasian War. During the civil war a few thousand applied for Russian visas and residency permits in order to resettle there, as a group of Kosovo Circassians did in 1998.[28] About 400 have resettled in Kabardino-Balkaria, 220 in Adygea and 40 in Karachay-Cherkessia.[29] Tastikin writes a total of 1,200 have left for Russia.[30]

Military support for the Assad government[edit]

Bashar and Asma al-Assad during a visit to Moscow.

Russia shipped large amounts of weapons to Bashar al-Assad[31] with Russia's contracts with Syria for arms are estimated to be worth 1.5 billion US dollars, comprising 10% of Russia's global arms sales as of 2012.[31]

The Syrian conflict began in early 2011 and, as word spread globally of the increasing death toll, Russia's arms sales sparked anger and criticism on the part of certain Western and Arab nations,[31] and global leaders encouraged Russia to end arms sales to Syria. Russian officials refused, however, noting the contractual obligations they were under with their customers,[9] and the Russian government defended its sales by pointing out that they did not violate any standing arms embargoes.[31]

As the conflict continued, Western anger over the arms sales grew. On 1 June, right after the Houla massacre, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton singled Russia out, condemning Russia's "continuous supply of arms to Syria" and that in her view, Russia's stance in the conflict was not neutral as it claimed it was.[32] In particular, there was ire over a report that Russia allegedly delivered arms to the Syrian port of Tartus in the same week of the infamous massacre. In response to this and to American criticism of Russia's policy on Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin denied that Russia was shipping any arms "which can be used in a civilian conflict" to Syria.[32] Later, the Russian foreign ministry also retaliated with a statement saying: "The tragedy in Houla showed what can be the outcome of financial aid and smuggling of modern weapons to rebels, recruitment of foreign mercenaries and flirting with various sorts of extremists."[32]

In addition to reportedly providing the refurbished MI-25 helicopter gunships, Russia has also transferred to Syria the Buk-M2 air defense system, the Bastion coastal defence missile system, and Yak-130 combat jet trainer.[11] Russian shipments of fuel have also assisted Assad,[33] and an unspecified number of military advisers are teaching Syrians how to use Russian weapons.[34] The head of Russia's federal service for military-technical co-operation confirmed that the repaired Syrian MI-25 attack helicopters were "ready to be delivered on time" adding that "Syria is our friend, and we fulfill all our obligations to our friends".[35] Amnesty International, noting the Syrian government's headlong deployment of military helicopters, criticised Russia: "Anyone supplying attack helicopters — or maintaining, repairing or upgrading them — for the Syrian government displays a wanton disregard for humanity."[36] Human Rights Watch warned Russia's state-owned arms-trading company Rosoboronexport in a letter that, under international law, "providing weapons to Syria while crimes against humanity are being committed may translate into assisting in the commission of those crimes", and called on governments and companies around the world to stop signing new contracts and consider suspending current dealings with the Russian company.[37]

In May 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Moscow in a bid to convince Vladimir Putin not to sell S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries and 144 missiles to Assad's government. The long-range air defense system would be a leap for Syria's current air defense system, enabling them to down fighter planes and cruise missiles.[38]

In October 2013 a group of Russian military contractors from Slavonic Corps (Славянский корпус) was deployed to As-Sukhnah and engaged in fire exchange and suffered losses. One of the contractors lost his ID, which was later published by Syrian and Russian media. Shortly after the group was retreated and the company disbanded.[39]

The Assad government has used Russian-supplied MI-8 and Mi-17 helicopters to carry out barrel-bomb attacks in Homs. According to former senior American intelligence official Jeffrey White, Russia is most likely providing spare parts such as engines, transmissions and rotors.[40]

In January 2014 a Russian company AR 514 (514 авиационный ремонтный завод) posted photos in their portfolio showing them performing repairs and upgrade on Su-24 identified to belong to Syrian fleet.[41] In 2015 Assad confirmed in an interview that Russia has been supplying arms to Syria based on contracts signed before and after the beginning of the conflict.[42]

During the war, Syrian officers and air defence personnel were trained in Russia.[43]

2015 intervention and airstrikes[edit]

Main articles: Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War and 2015 Russian air raids in Syria
Barack Obama meets with Vladimir Putin to discuss Syria, 29 September 2015

As of September 2015, Russia has stepped up its military presence in Syria, deploying 12 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 12 Su-24 interdictor aircraft,[44][45] 6 Sukhoi Su-34 medium bombers[46][47] and 4 Su-30 multirole combat aircraft and 15 helicopters (including Mi-24 attack helicopters)[48] at the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport near Latakia.[49][50][51][52][53] The planes are protected by at least two or possibly three SA-22 surface-to-air, antiaircraft systems, and unarmed MQ-1 Predator-like surveillance drones are being used to fly reconnaissance missions.[50] In addition to air forces, ground forces include 6 T-90 tanks, 15 artillery pieces, 35 armored personnel carriers and 200 Marines (with housing facilities for 1,500 personnel)[54] BM-30 multiple missile launchers have been spotted near Latakia.[55]

On 30 September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin requested permission from Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to deploy the country's military in Syria.[56] On the same day, Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, the Islamic State in particular.[56] Permission was granted after a unanimous vote, however any combat operations will be limited to using the air force.[57] Russian media reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had asked for Russia to intervene by providing military assistance.[58]

On 30 September 2015, Russia launched its first airstrikes against targets in Rastan, Talbiseh, and Zafaraniya in Homs province of Syria.[59][60][61][62] Moscow gave the United States a one-hour advanced notice of its operations.[63] The Homs area is crucial to President Bashar al-Assad’s control of western Syria. Insurgent control of the area would separate the coastal cities of Latakia (where Russian aircraft are based) and Tartous where Russia operates a naval facility from Damascus.[64]

On 1 October, the Russian Defence Ministry stated it had deployed over 50 planes (including also Su-34) and helicopters to Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. It was possible because we had most of the materiel and ammunition ready at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some extra equipment."[16]

Reactions[edit]

Domestic[edit]

In May 2012 Patriarch Kirill I of the Russian Orthodox Church, as argument for supporting President Assad’s reign, warned that a wave of Islamic fundamentalism unleashed by the Arab Spring might sweep away Christians (10% of the Syrian population) in Syria. He illustrated that danger by pointing at the persecution of Christians during the Bolshevik revolution and ensuing Russian civil war (1917–1922)[65] while Orthodox Christians make up 75% of the Russian population.

Foreign[edit]

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised Russia for "repeating the mistakes of Western governments during the Arab Spring by continuing to support a longstanding authoritarian ally [Assad] whose people have clearly expressed the desire for democratic change".[66] The human rights group also accused Russia of selectively using one of its reports to support a one-sided position on Syria.[67]

Former UK ambassador to Russia from 2004 to 2008, Tony Brenton, said in April 2012 that Russia is looking – in Syria – for its first opportunity since the Cold War to boost its brokering abilities.[9]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Statement by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, 28 September 2015. (Unofficial translation.) un.org. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  2. ^ Khomami, Nadia. "UN general assembly: International community has failed Syrians, says Rouhani". TheGuardian. Retrieved 9 October 2015.
  3. ^ "Russia says Syria agrees to peace talks with opposition amid mounting pressures". Al Arabiya. 30 January 2012. Retrieved 29 November 2013.
  4. ^ Julian Borger. "West 'ignored Russian offer in 2012 to have Syria's Assad step aside'". The Guardian. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  5. ^ a b Canceled Syria talks may get new start in Moscow, USA Today, 7 November 2013. Retrieved 25 November 2013.
  6. ^ a b c d Sharp, Jeremy M. (1 May 2008), "Syria: Background and U.S. Relations", CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC{{citation}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  7. ^ Barry, Anya (9 February 2012). "Adding Fuel to Syria's Fire". FPIF. Retrieved 16 February 2012.
  8. ^ Grove, Thomas (17 August 2011). "Russia to sell arms to Syria, sales overall to rise". Reuters. Retrieved 12 March 2012.
  9. ^ a b c [dead link]Meyer, Henry (20 April 2012). "Putin Pins Hope on Syria Cease-Fire to Combat U.S. Supremacy". Bloomberg Businessweek. Retrieved 20 April 2012.
  10. ^ Cite error: The named reference foreign affairs was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  11. ^ a b Sayginer, Ozge (20 June 2012). "Why Russia will never back down? Reasons behind supporting the Assad regime". The European Strategist. Retrieved 23 June 2012.
  12. ^ Cite error: The named reference Economist was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  13. ^ Sharp, Jeremy M.; Christopher M. Blanchard, eds. (26 March 2012), "Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime", CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service
  14. ^ "All personnel withdrawn from Russian navy base in Syria – diplomat". RT, 26 June 2013
  15. ^ "Russia reports pullout from small base in Syria". The Washington Post. 26 June 2013
  16. ^ a b http://www.rt.com/news/317179-russian-airforce-syria-aircraft/
  17. ^ Julan Borger (23 December 2012). "Russian military presence in Syria poses challenge to US-led intervention". The Guardian. Retrieved 24 December 2012.
  18. ^ "Captured Russian spy facility reveals the extent of Russian aid to the Assad regime". 6 October 2014. Retrieved 7 October 2014.
  19. ^ "Syria: Russia evacuates nationals, remains close to Assad". Beirut: ANSAmed. 25 January 2013. Retrieved 27 January 2013.
  20. ^ "Russian spy base in Syria used to monitor rebels and Israel seized". The Daily Telegraph. 8 October 2014. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  21. ^ "Militants from Russia's North Caucasus join "jihad" in Syria". Reuters. 6 March 2013.
  22. ^ "Why being Chechen is a badge of honor for Islamist militants". The Washington Post. 3 July 2014.
  23. ^ "Should Georgia Fear IS Threat To Its Pankisi Gorge?". Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. October 14, 2014.
  24. ^ "Syria crisis: Omar Shishani, Chechen jihadist leader". BBC. 3 December 2013. Retrieved 20 December 2013.
  25. ^ "Insurgent group pledges allegiance to al Qaeda's Syria wing". Reuters. 23 September 2015.
  26. ^ "Security Service At Moscow Airport Detains Siberian Man Suspected To Join ISIS In Syria". IBTimes. 24 September 2015.
  27. ^ "The Chechen Leader With A Grudge And The IS Commander With Nine Lives". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 14 November 2014.
  28. ^ "World: Europe Circassians flee Kosovo conflict", BBC, 2 August 1998
  29. ^ Circassians in Syria Seek Ways to Return Homeland. Journal of the Turkish Weekly. 31 January 2013.
  30. ^ Tastekin, Fahim. Syria’s Circassians Caught in Crossfire. Al-Monitor. 21 November 2012.
  31. ^ a b c d Richard Galpin (10 January 2012). "Russian arms shipments bolster Syria's embattled Assad". BBC News. Retrieved 4 February 2012.
  32. ^ a b c "UN calls for investigation into Houla killings in Syria". BBC News. 1 June 2012.
  33. ^ Jessica Donati; Julia Payne (26 April 2012). "How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria". Reuters. Retrieved 28 April 2012.
  34. ^ "Syria: Moscow sends navy vessels to Syrian port". The Scotsman. 19 June 2012. Retrieved 23 June 2012.
  35. ^ Elder, Miriam., The Guardian, Thursday 28 June 2012., Syria will receive attack helicopters from Russia, Kremlin confirms http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/28/syria-receive-attack-helicopter-risussia?newsfeed=true
  36. ^ "Syria: Reports of helicopter shipments underscore need for arms embargo". Amnesty International. 19 June 2012. Retrieved 25 June 2012.
  37. ^ "Isolate Syria's Arms Suppliers". Human Rights Watch. 3 June 2012. Retrieved 29 June 2012.
  38. ^ Jay Solomon, Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes (9 May 2013). "U.S. Is Warned Russia Plans Syria Arms Sale". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  39. ^ "Russian contractors in Syria". 6 November 2014. Retrieved 7 October 2014.
  40. ^ Gordon, Michael R.; Sanger, David E.; Schmitt, Eric (17 February 2014). "U.S. Steps Up Criticism of Russian Role in Syrian War". The New York Times.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  41. ^ "Syria's recently upgraded Su-24s (2)". 5 January 2014. Retrieved 7 October 2014.
  42. ^ "Syria gets Russian arms under deals signed since conflict began: Assad". Reuters. 31 March 2015. Retrieved 31 March 2015.
  43. ^ "Insight: Russia's Syria diplomacy, a game of smoke and mirrors". Reuters. 6 June 2013. Retrieved 6 June 2013.
  44. ^ Thomas Gibbons-Neff (21 September 2015). "This is the airpower Russia has in Syria". The Washington Post. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  45. ^ les premières images des avions russes en Syrie. YouTube. 28 September 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  46. ^ http://theaviationist.com/2015/09/29/su-34-have-arrived-in-syria/
  47. ^ http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/first-video-report-from-russias-air-base-in-syria-shows-1734218079
  48. ^ [1] Russian Fighter Aircraft Arrive in Syria 21 September 2015, Stratfor
  49. ^ http://www.janes.com/article/54709/russia-deploys-powerful-strike-group-to-syria
  50. ^ a b http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/world/middleeast/russia-deploys-ground-attack-aircraft-to-syrian-base.html
  51. ^ "Russian Fighter Aircraft Arrive in Syria". Stratfor. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  52. ^ "New Satellite Image unveils an impressive line-up of 12 Russian Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets in Syria!". The Aviationist. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  53. ^ "Russian jets in Syria mean no-fly zone is 'out of the question', warn experts". The Daily Telegraph. 22 September 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  54. ^ Schmitt, Eric; Gordon, Michael R. (14 Sep 2015]). "Russian Moves in Syria Widen Role in Mideast" The New York Times
  55. ^ Dylan Vosman. "In Syria spotted Russian BM-30 heavy multiple rocket launcher". Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  56. ^ a b Cite error: The named reference RT-1 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  57. ^ Shaun Walker. "Russian parliament grants Vladimir Putin right to deploy military in Syria". The Guardian. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  58. ^ "Совет Федерации разрешил использовать ВС России за рубежом". РИА Новости. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  59. ^ "Russia begins air strikes in Syria". ABC News. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  60. ^ ‫تلبيسة اللحظات الاولى من الغارات من الطيران الروسي واستخراج الشهداء والجرحى من تحت الانقاض – YouTube. YouTube. 30 September 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  61. ^ Shaun Walker. "Russia launches first airstrikes against targets in Syria". The Guardian. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  62. ^ "U.S. official: Russia launches first Syria airstrike". USA Today. 30 September 2015. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  63. ^ "Russia Confirms Carrying Out Airstrikes in Syria". Haaretz. Retrieved 30 September 2015.
  64. ^ http://www.euronews.com/2015/09/30/syria-russian-air-strikes-have-started-according-to-us-official/
  65. ^ Barry, Ellen (31 May 2012). "Russian Church Is a Strong Voice Opposing Intervention in Syria". The New York Times. Retrieved 11 October 2015.
  66. ^ "Russia Repeats Western Mistakes in Arab Spring". Human Rights Watch. 23 January 2012. Retrieved 11 October 2015.
  67. ^ "Russia: Selective Use of Syria Findings". Human Rights Watch. 23 March 2012. Retrieved 30 June 2012.

Further reading[edit]

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